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Abstract—Traditional use of dynamic time warping for signa-
ture veriﬁcation consists of forming some dissimilarity mea-
sure between the signature in question and a set of “template
signatures”. In this paper, we propose to replace this set with
the hidden signature and use it to calculate the normalized er-
rors of signature under veriﬁcation. The approach was tested
on the MCYT database, using both genuine signatures and
skilled forgeries. Moreover, we present the real-world applica-
tion of the proposed algorithm, namely the complete biometric
system for authorizing payment transactions. The authoriza-
tion is performed directly at a point of sale by the automatic
signature veriﬁcation system based on the hidden signature.
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1. Introduction
Despite an abundance of computers systems, handwritten
signature is still widely used in everyday life. It is still es-
sential for most of the ﬁnancial transactions, notarial deeds,
etc. However, there exists a considerable risk that some-
one can forge a signature. Forensic handwriting experts,
whose discipline is forensic document examination, can tell
a forgery from a genuine with almost 100% accuracy, but
it is hard to imagine to seat a graphologist next to every
bank worker. What is more, a forensic document exam-
iners usually needs more than few seconds to perform his
procedures. In spite of problems related to handwritten
signature, it is still irreplaceable in many places. That is
why there exists a great demand for automatic signature
veriﬁcation systems.
The ﬁrst article describing automatic signature veriﬁcation
systems was published in 1979 by Herbst [1], that is more
than 30 years ago. Even if the idea of automatic signature
veriﬁcation systems is a very good solution for banks and
other places, it is still not commonly used in everyday life.
This has a number of causes. First, in the very beginning,
this idea was more like science ﬁction, and paying with
plastic cards instead of paper money was not very common
outside the US. The high cost and low quality of digitaliz-
ing tablets also curbed the on-line veriﬁcation development.
But it changed. Now, there exist tablets designed for signa-
ture veriﬁcation. They are easy to get and their prices are
not too steep.
The digitalizing tablets are important, because they alow
for on-line signature capture. It means that the signature is
represented as a sequence in time. The characteristic fea-
ture of signatures is that the instances of one signature can
diﬀer strongly between each other. This can be caused both
by natural ﬂuctuations and physical or emotional states.
Two given instances can diﬀer in amplitudes or values at
certain points, but also in the signature dynamics. In other
words, the time scales of two signatures can be diﬀerent,
which makes direct (point by point) comparisons impossi-
ble. For that issue, a nonlinear sequence alignment method
is needed.
One approach that can be employed is dynamic time warp-
ing (DTW). The basic idea behind DTW is to “warp” the
time dimension of two varying time sequences in a non-
linear manner. This allows for measuring dissimilarity be-
tween them.
We successfully used this approach in our original signa-
ture veriﬁcation method. That is why in this paper we
concentrate on methods based on DTW. These methods
may diﬀer in many important aspects. For example, DTW
can be used only to compute the ﬁnal score or to construct
a classiﬁer. However, what all such systems have in com-
mon is the template creation stage, in which either several
(e.g., three, [2], [3]) or a single signature ([4], [5], [6]) is
selected to represent the training set. While this selection
has a big impact on the system quality, it is often arbi-
trary, and typically consists of choosing the signature(s)
being closest (in some metric) to the rest of the training
signatures. Some authors selected the template signature at
random, or without elaboration on the statistic used for the
selection [6].
The diversity of solutions shows two important problems
associated with it. Both of these problems lie in template
creation, which is seemingly very easy, and generally is
limited to selecting a subset of a persons signatures. How-
ever – and this is the ﬁrst problem – we do not know how
many signatures should be selected for the template. Sec-
ond, even if we resolve the ﬁrst problem, we still do not
know, which of the signatures should be selected.
The approach presented in this paper makes an eﬀort to
meet the mentioned needs. It is based on the well known
property of least square solutions, namely, that the aver-
age minimize the squared norm distance to all averaged
elements. While a direct averaging of signatures is not
possible (even signature instances of the same person may
have diﬀerent length and may diﬀer not only in magnitudes
of the measured quantities but also in their “local speed”),
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we may transform all training signatures to a common space
by warping and then ﬁnd their average in this space. This
approach carries on various properties of least squares,
while bringing in a possibility of local variation by proper
warping. The averaged warped signature is called the hid-
den signature. It is an artiﬁcial signature which has a fea-
ture of minimizing the mean dissimilarity between itself
and the signatures from the training set. By the limit laws
of probability theory, the hidden signature is “close” to the
mean value of the real signature after warping, thus assur-
ing the proper level of invariance with the training set. The
hidden signature can be calculated numerically.
Authorizing payment transactions is a straightforward area
of application for signature veriﬁcation systems. People are
accustomed to using their signature to conﬁrm the identity
when paying with debit cards or credit cards. However,
the veriﬁcation method that is commonly used, namely the
visual comparison performed by a cashier, leaves much to
be desired. The sales staﬀ is usually barely educated in the
ﬁeld of signatures veriﬁcation and the risk of both false ac-
ceptance and false rejection may be signiﬁcant. The above
facts argue for the need of developing the automatic sig-
nature veriﬁcation system for the purpose of authorizing
payment transactions.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section 2, we
show the proposed hidden signature estimation methodol-
ogy. In Section 3, we introduce the veriﬁcation algorithm
that employs hidden signature for veriﬁcation. Section 4
presents the application of the presented algorithm in au-
thorizing payment transactions. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2. Hidden Signature Estimation
The hidden signature approach extends the least squares
approach. In the least squares approach, the least squares
model approaches the expected value as the number of ob-
servations increases to inﬁnity, and for independent data it
is also the most eﬀective (in the statistical sense, e.g., it
leads to a given error variance) for the least sample size.
Since our approach is a conjunction of the least square mod-
eling and optimal warping, the resulting model has some
optimality properties, and it approaches the expected value
of the signature, calculated with the use of warping. In
other way, it approaches a form which is independent on
particular signature instances. It is also independent on
sampling frequency (which is not true for other warping
models). This is why we may call it a }perfect instance of
a signature.
In [7], we proposed two main directions for hidden
signature estimation. First, iterative point-by-point averag-
ing, and second, evolutionary algorithms. Each of those
algorithms is constructed as an iterative procedure that
alternates the warping steps and the averaging steps. Let
(G1, . . . ,GN) be a set of training signatures (the results
presented here were calculated for N = 10). At each
iteration stage, the algorithm corrects its approximation of
the hidden signature G∗ = g∗(t), t = 1,2, . . . ,MG∗ , MG∗ ∈ N,
by minimizing the quality index:
VH = minj=1...H ∑i=1..N
ˆD(G∗ j,Gi) , (1)
where ˆD(G1,G2) denotes the dissimilarity measure be-
tween two signatures G1 and G2 (wide Eqs.(6), (7)).
Regardless of the estimation method, the resulting hid-
den signature depends on the coordinates selected to com-
pute the dissimilarity measure and the warping path. This
method was ﬁrst proposed in [7] together with several
others. All those methods yielded comparable results; the
method presented was chosen as preferred because of its
computation times, which were considerably shorter than
the times of the other methods.
2.1. DTW Background
Dynamic time warping is used to compute the optimal
alignment, written in a form of warping path w, between
variable length discreet sequences:
R = r(t), t = 1,2, . . . ,MR, MR ∈ N (2)
and
G = g(τ), τ = 1,2, . . . ,MG, MG ∈N . (3)
A warping path w is a parametric discrete curve parame-
terised by ℓ, that aligns R and G via a point-to-point map-
ping (Fig. 1). The warping path can be deﬁned as:
w(ℓ) = [wt(ℓ) wτ (ℓ)]
T ; ℓ ∈ 1, . . . ,Lw , (4)
where
wt(ℓ) ∈ {t}, t = 1, . . . ,MR ,
wτ (ℓ) ∈ {τ}, τ = 1, . . . ,MG , (5)
where wt(ℓ) and wτ(ℓ) are two parameterised by ℓ functions
of aligned sequence indexes. Thus, w(ℓ) maps successive
steps ℓ to a points (t,τ) where 1≤ t ≤MR and 1 ≤ τ ≤ MG.
The warping path length Lw is a consequence of the
minimisation process that minimise the overall distortion
Eqs. (6 and 7).
The overall distortion D(R,G,w):
D(R,G,w) =
Lw∑
ℓ=1
d (r(wt (ℓ)),g(wτ(ℓ))) (6)
is based on the sum of local distances d (r(wt (ℓ)),g(wτ(ℓ)))
between sequences elements at points, belonging to warp-
ing path. In the set of possible warping paths w ∈W, we
can ﬁnd the optimal warping path wˆ, such that its associated
distortion (dissimilarity measure) is at a minimum:
ˆD(R,G) = min
w∈W
D(R,G,w) ,
wˆ = arg min
w∈W
D(R,G,w) . (7)
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Fig. 1. The compared curves, and its alignment visualization (a).
Warping path on a two-dimensional grid: discrete warped time
τ ∈ [0,MG] versus discrete reference time t ∈ [0,MR] (b). The
compared curves are also plotted (the reference curve is plotted
vertically).
Allowing for diﬀerences caused by time warping, we still
encounter diﬀerences in sequence values at the aligned time
instances d (r(wt(ℓ)),g(wτ (ℓ))), where t = 1, . . . ,MR and
τ = 1, . . . ,MG. These diﬀerences can be measured at the
aligned times using typical distance metrics, for instance
with the L2 distance but it is not limited to:
d(a,b) = ‖a−b‖2 . (8)
2.2. Transformation from One Time Space to Another
The iterative point-by-point averaging (IPPA) is a method
built on the concept of an average signature. If the signa-
tures from a training set were the same length, the hidden
signature could be simply computed as an average in each
point.
However, like it was presented before, in each of the per-
sons signature realizations the time ﬂows diﬀerently. To
overcome this problem we proposed the algorithm that
Fig. 2. A transformation into a diﬀerent signature time space:
(a) the DTW nonlinear alignment of two time sequences R and G;
(b) the linear alignment between R and G′ (G in R time space).
transforms the training signatures into one common time
space, thus obtaining signatures of the same length. The
common time space, means that both signatures have the
same length and the optimal warping path has only diago-
nal steps, which means that alignment between signatures
is liner (Fig. 2b). The result of proposed transformation is
presented in Fig. 2.
We assumed that we need a simple and fast transformation
from one signature time space to a time space of second
signature. Therefore we proposed the following procedure,
transforming signature G into a time space of signature R,
thus obtaining G′ = g′(t), t = 1, . . . ,MR:
wˆ = arg min
w∈W
D(R,G,w) , (9)
g′(t; wˆ) =
∑ℓ:wt(ℓ)=t g(wˆτ(ℓ))
|l : wt(l) = t|
, , t = 1, ..,MR ,
where t denotes the time of R = r(t), t = 1, . . . , ,MR and
operator |.| set cardinality. The illustration of this transfor-
mation is presented in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. A transformation into a diﬀerent signature time space:
(a) calculation of the warping path w between R and G; (b) G is
transformed into the time space of R using the warping path w.
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2.3. Iterative Point-by-Point Averaging
The Eq. (9) denotes a method of a signature transforma-
tion into a time space of another signature. However, it is
assumed that the target time space is known. We assume
that during each successive iteration only one estimation
of hidden signature is calculated. Additionally, the hidden
signature size is given by M, that can be set equally for the
all users templates, or individually for each. In the begin-
ning, we proposed to calculate the hidden signature length
as the simple average (rounded down) of signatures from
the training set, independently for each user, namely:
M =
1
N
N
∑
n=1
Mn . (10)
Finally, we assume that in the initial iteration, all training
signatures {G1, . . . ,GN} are linearly graduated into a time
length M, the assumed size of a hidden signature (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. Linearly graduation into a time length M.
As the result we obtain N training signatures of length M,
namely
{
G′(0)1 , . . . ,G
′(0)
N
}
.
Detailed mathematical description has been omitted for the
sake of simplicity. Using this starting set, it is possible to
calculate the initial estimation of hidden signature G∗(0):
g∗(0)(t) =
1
N
N
∑
n=1
g′(0)n (t), t = 1, . . . ,M . (11)
Then, in each successive iteration k = 1,2, . . . newly com-
puted hidden signature approximation is used to calculate
N warping paths between itself and the signatures from the
training set, thus minimizing the quality index:
wˆkn = wˆ
k
n(G∗
(k−1)
,Gn) = arg min
w
D(G∗(k−1),Gn,w),
n = 1, . . . ,N
(12)
then, the warping paths are used to transform the train-
ing signatures into the new hidden signature approximation
G∗(k) space using DTW. As the result of this operation,
we obtain N signatures with the lengths equal to the hid-
den signature length M. We can then calculate a new hid-
den signature approximation as a weighted mean for each
point:
g∗(k)(t) =
1
N ∑
n=1...N
g′n(t; wˆ
(k)
n ), , t = 1, . . . ,M (13)
where g′n is calculated from Eq. (9). This process repeats
in every iteration, because changing warping paths imply
changes in the hidden signature approximation. Visualiza-
tion of this method is presented in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. The iteration process of iterative point by point averaging
with one minimization at each stage.
To apply the hidden signature concept, we used it in our
two stage approach, which employs the DTW for comput-
ing the ﬁnal score. In [7], we showed that replacing the
representative of a training set with the hidden signature
allows to achieve better veriﬁcation results in the existing
global on-line system. Here, we extend our approach to
exploit the properties of the hidden signature by using its
certain statistics.
3. Veriﬁcation Algorithm – Error Signal
Approach
Error signals approach is a simple method dedicated for
on-line veriﬁcation with hidden signature.
3.1. Template
For the new approach to DTW, we proposed a parametric
template:
λu = {G∗(u),σ (u)} , (14)
where u denotes the user identiﬁer. This template consist
of the hidden signature G∗ and its corresponding standard
deviation σ sequence. Hidden signature is created form
users u training signatures {G1, . . . ,GN}. Standard devi-
ation is calculated as the roots of mean-square errors be-
tween the hidden signature and the training signatures at
each hidden signature point, independently for each feature
f ∈ {∆x,∆y, p} sequence:
σ f (i) =
√
1
N
N
∑
n=1
(g′n(i, f )−g∗(i, f )) , i = 1, . . . ,M ,
(15)
where feature sequences are used according to deﬁnition of
signature for each feature f sequence as:
G f = g(τ, f ), τ = 1,2, . . . ,MG, MG ∈ N . (16)
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Table 1
On-line systems comparison
Authors Year FAR [%] FRR [%] EER [%] No. of users Database
Quan et al. [9] 2006 7 100 MCYT Online
Miguel-Hurtado, O. et al. [5] 2007 8 100 MCYT Online
Garcia-Salicetti, Dorizzi [10] 2007 3.37 100 MCYT Online
Guru, Prakash [11] 2007 9.16 5.42 5.3 100 MCYT Online
Galbally, Ortega-Garcia [12] 2007 3.5 330 MCYT 330
Faundez-Zanuy [13] 2007 5.4 330 MCYT 330
Nanni and Lumini [14] 2008 5.2 100 MCYT Online
Yanikoglu and Kholmatov [15] 2009 7.22 100 MCYT Online
This work 2010 1.74 1.82 1.72 100 MCYT Online
The features f were selected, due to our previous experi-
ments, presented in [8]. Additionally, we want the system
to work with LCD tablets, and they allows only for x, y and
pressure acquisition.
3.2. Verification Stage
In the veriﬁcation stage, a signature in question Gq, after the
transformation into the hidden signature space G′q Eq. (9),
can be standardized for every feature, by point-by-point
subtraction of the hidden signature G∗ as the sequence of
mean values, and division by the standard deviations σ ,
given by Eq. (15):
g
′′
q(i, f ) =
g′q(i, f )−g∗(i, f )
σ f (i)
, i = 1, . . . ,M , (17)
where f ∈ {∆x,∆y, p}. The new resulting standardized se-
quences G′′q,∆x,G
′′
q,∆y,G
′′
q,p, are called the error signals, be-
cause they represent a normalize errors between signature
in question and hidden signature at each point of a se-
quence.
We propose the ﬁnal SCOREH used in at the veriﬁcation
stage. For the signature in question Gq its selected values
are used for the scores calculations:
SCOREH(G′′q;G∗,σ)=
∥∥∥∥[s2(G′′q,∆x) s2(G′′q,∆y) s2(G′′q,p)]T
∥∥∥∥
2
,
(18)
where: Q denotes the arithmetic mean value of the Q se-
quence, s2(Q) denotes the standard variance of non-zero
values of Q sequence, and ‖q‖2 denotes the Euclidean norm
of q.
The logical sense of these scores is that the error signal G′′f
is a resulting signal of normalization with a use of the
hidden signature. This means, the closer is the veriﬁed
signature GQ to the hidden signature, the lower are the
values at each point of the error signal.
The ﬁnal stage of veriﬁcation is very simple. The signature
in question Gq is accepted if following condition is satisﬁed:
SCOREH ≤ θ .
The threshold θ is calculated during the estimation phase.
3.3. Testing Methodology and Results
The tests were conducted on the MCYT on-line
database [16] (MCYT Online for 100 users). Our method-
ology was to evaluate in simulated real-world conditions.
For this goal, the database was divided into two parts.
The estimation data used for the estimation phase in-
cluded 40 persons, and the remaining 60 person data was
used as the testing data. The ﬁrst part of the data was
used for the estimation of the equal error rate (EER)
and the corresponding threshold θ . In the testing phase,
we checked the repetitiveness of our approach. We used
the remaining 60 persons of the 100-people database for
testing data, and ﬁxed the same threshold θ as that adjusted
for the ﬁrst database part. In practice, it was the level of
threshold θ for the EER obtained in the estimating phase.
We then obtained false acceptance rate (FAR) and false re-
jection rate (FRR). If results of FAR and FRR are close
to the EER obtained for the ﬁrst part of the database, then
they can be trusted. The presented results were obtained
after 1000 diﬀerent distributions of database for phases:
• estimating phase: EER = 1.72±0.25%;
• testing phase:
– FRR = 1.82±0.86%,
– FAR = 1.74±0.3% (skilled forgeries),
– FAR = 0.06±0.05% (random forgeries).
4. Implementation
We propose to employ the automatic signature veriﬁcation
system based on the hidden signature for the purpose of au-
thorizing payment transactions. In NASK Biometric Lab-
oratories, we designed an adaptation of the veriﬁcation al-
gorithm presented in Section 3 to the platform of payment
terminals. Together with the MCX Systems Company that
specializes in developing software for payment terminals,
we prepared the implementation that can be run directly on
the terminal used at a point of sale (POS). We also built
a prototype of a complete biometric system for authorizing
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payment transactions. The system consists of three compo-
nents: an enrollment stand, a POS terminal with biometric
signature veriﬁcation and a technique for storing biometric
templates.
The automatic signature veriﬁcation system can replace the
cashier in performing the veriﬁcation or can serve as a de-
cision support system for the cashier.
4.1. Hardware Platform
Payment terminals make a demanding programming en-
vironment due to a limited computational power, reduced
memory and (usually) only a software support for ﬂoating
point operations.
Fig. 6. Terminal with tablet.
For the purpose of our prototype system, we used the In-
genico i5100 terminal. It is equipped with ARM7TDMI
processing unit with computational power of about
30 MIPS. There is 2 MB of RAM memory available, yet
only 256 kB can be used by the algorithm due to the re-
quirements of other applications and the operating system.
The terminal is connected with the Wacom STU-500 LCD
signature tablet that is specially designed to capture digital
signatures.
The speciﬁcation of the terminal, together with time con-
straints related to payment transactions, required developing
a specialized implementation of the veriﬁcation system.
4.2. DTW Implementation
An eﬀective implementation of the DTW algorithm is cru-
cial from the performance point of view. The comparison
of two signatures in a given space is relatively cheap, yet
ﬁnding the optimal warping path requires solving a dy-
namic programming task with the quadratic time and space
complexity.
In order to overcome the problem, we performed numer-
ous steps that allowed us to reduce time and memory
requirements of the DTW algorithm. First, we limited
the maximum length of signatures to 500 points (longer
signatures were subjected to downsampling). Second, we
employed the Sakoe-Chuba Band constraint [17] to limit
the number of cells that are evaluated in the cost ma-
trix. We chose the window size according to a trade-oﬀ
between memory requirements and the veriﬁcation qual-
ity (only a minor increase of the ERR was observed af-
ter applying the constraint on the MCYT database). Fi-
nally, we reduced the memory requirements by using
two moving buﬀers combined with a bitmap of the cost
matrix (Fig. 7).
Fig. 7. Visualization of a discrete DTW implementation using
a cost matrix. The number of cells that are evaluated is limited and
two moving buﬀers are used to reduce the memory requirements.
The idea of using moving buﬀers is the following. Dynamic
programming algorithms can be visualized as “ﬁlling an ar-
ray”. In DTW, each cell of the array represents the total
cost of the best warping path reaching this cell (i.e., the
partial warping path ending in this cell). The array is ﬁlled
starting from the lower-left corner. After the whole array
is ﬁlled, the value in the upper-right corner represents the
minimal cost of the whole warping path. It is possible to
reconstruct the best warping path by moving back from the
upper-right corner, choosing always the neighboring cell
with the lowest (partial) cost value (according to the Bell-
man’s Dynamic Programming rule).
However, one may notice that it is not necessary to re-
member the whole array. Suppose that from a given cell
we can move only in three directions (right, up and diago-
nal upper-right). In order to ﬁll the nth column of the array
(starting form the lowest cell), we need only to know the
(n−1)th column. Hence, instead of keeping the whole cost
matrix in memory, we may use two moving buﬀers, each
one to store one column. After performing the whole run,
we obtain the same optimal cost in the upper-right corner
of the matrix. In addition, we need to store the information
that would allow us to reconstruct the best warping path.
We achieve this by remembering in each cell the informa-
tion about the previous cell of the warping path. We code
such information using two bits (as there are only three di-
rections possible: left, down and diagonal lower-left) and
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we store it an additional bitmap. As a result, instead of
keeping all values of the cost matrix in memory (usually
ﬂoating point values with double precision), we need only
the memory for two moving buﬀers and the bitmap.
4.3. Performance and Memory Requirements
A combination of the techniques described in the previ-
ous section allowed us to obtain the reasonable memory
requirements presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Memory requirements
Source of the requirement
Memory
[kB]
Buﬀer for the raw signature 18
Buﬀer for the template 6
Temporary buﬀer for an exemplary signature 3
Temporary buﬀer for a candidate signature 3
Buﬀer for the warping path 5
Bitmap 20
Two moving buﬀers 1
Total: 56
The eﬀective implementation of the DTW algorithm deter-
mined the following running times on the terminal:
– veriﬁcation of a single signature below 5 s,
– template creation (from 5 signatures): 2–5 min, de-
pending on the signatures length.
From the practical applications perspective, only the ver-
iﬁcation time is important as the enrollment procedure is
usually performed outside the terminal. The veriﬁcation
time of 5 s is satisfactory as far as payment transactions
are concerned. Moreover, this time may be further reduced
using more powerful modern terminals.
The correctness of the results has also been veriﬁed: we
performed tests on the MCYT database using the terminal
for veriﬁcations. We observed some minor diﬀerences in
the obtained scores (resulting from diﬀerent ﬂoating point
implementations), yet the veriﬁcation results were identical
on both PC and the payment terminal platforms.
4.4. Prototype of the System
Basing on the running times obtained in Subsection 4.3,
we proposed the following operational scenario: signa-
ture templates should be created using a specialized enroll-
ment stand (e.g., equipped with a PC computer) and pay-
ment terminals should only perform signatures veriﬁcation
during payment transactions. According to this scenario,
we build a prototype biometric system for authorizing pay-
ment transactions (Fig. 8).
The ﬁrst element of the system is an enrollment stand. The
stand is composed of a PC computer, a smart card reader
Fig. 8. Prototype of the system: a demonstration stand (a) and
a sample printout (b).
and the STU-500 tablet for gathering signatures. The pro-
cess of enrollment is controlled by a specialized application.
The functionality of the application includes:
– creating templates basing on exemplary signatures
and performing signatures veriﬁcation,
– analyzing the template’s consistency,
– saving the template in the internal database or on
a smart card based on the JavaCard technology,
– making templates accessible via the HTTP protocol,
– visualizing signatures in real-time during writing.
The second element of the system is a payment terminal
with a similar STU-500 tablet. The application installed
on the terminal allows to simulate a real payment trans-
action at a point of sale: the cashier scans the customer’s
credit card, enters the amount of the transaction and waits
for the authorization. At the end, the conﬁrmation of the
transaction is printed (Fig. 8b).
The transaction is authorized using automatic signature ver-
iﬁcation. The application running on the terminal down-
loads the template, captures the signature in question from
the tablet and performs the veriﬁcation. Both magnetic
cards and smart cards are supported by the terminal.
The last element of the system is a mechanism of stor-
ing and transferring biometric templates. There are two
alternative ways of storing templates, namely an on-line
scheme and an off-line scheme. In the on-line scheme, tem-
plates are stored in a database and can be accessed via the
HTTP protocol. The terminal scans the unique number
of the customer’s magnetic card, connects to the database
using Ethernet connection, downloads the customer’s tem-
plate and performs veriﬁcation. In the oﬀ-line scheme, the
customer’s template is stored in the customer’s smart card.
The terminal reads the template directly from the card and
performs veriﬁcation.
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5. Conclusions
The presented novel approach to signature veriﬁcation
draws from the hidden signature concept and diﬀers from
the traditional DTW-based methods. This approach is
based on replacing the template signatures with an artiﬁcial
signature – the hidden signature.
The proposed method can be regarded as model-based,
since the hidden signature can be thought as an approx-
imation of a perfect signature of a given person.
The veriﬁcation algorithm is based on computing error sig-
nals between the signature in question and the model. In
comparison to results of other systems, obtained on the
MCYT database (see Table 1), the complex system for hid-
den signature results is placed very high.
While the results obtained in tests on the MCYT database
are promising, the method is mostly based on an engineer-
ing approach to error signals processing, and could beneﬁt
from more sophisticated comparison algorithms.
The overall simplicity allows this method to be used in mo-
bile or embedded systems. One of them is the system for
signature veriﬁcation in authorizing payment transactions.
The eﬀective implementation of the proposed approach al-
lowed to meet the memory and computational power con-
straints of payment terminals, as well as the time constraints
of payment transactions. The automatic signature veriﬁca-
tion based on the hidden signature can be performed di-
rectly on the payment terminal at a point of sale.
Acknowledgements
This paper has been ﬁnanced by the Ministry of Science
and Higher Education grant OR00 0026 07 “A platform of
secure biometrics implementations in personal verification
and identification”.
References
[1] N. Herbst and C. Liu, “Automatic signature veriﬁcation based on
accelerometry”, in IBM J. Res. Develop., pp. 245–253, 1977.
[2] D. Sakamoto, H. Morita, T. Ohishi, Y. Komiya, and T. Matsumoto,
“On-line signature veriﬁer incorporating pen position, pen pressure
and pen inicliation trajectories”, in Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. AVBPA 2001,
Halmstad, Sweden, 2001, pp. 318–323.
[3] A. Pacut and J. Putz-Leszczyńska, “Dynamic time warping in sub-
spaces for on-line signature veriﬁcation”, in Proc. 12th Conf. Int.
Graphonom. Soc. IGS 2005, Salerno, Italy, 2005, pp. 108–112.
[4] A. Kholmatov and B. Yanikoglu, “Identity authentication using im-
proved online signature veriﬁcation method”, Pattern Recogn. Lett.,
vol. 26, no. 15, pp. 2400–2408, 2005.
[5] O. Miguel-Hurtado, L. Mengibar-Pozo, M. Lorenz, and J. Liu-
Jimenez, “On-line signature veriﬁcation by dynamic time warping
and gaussian mixture models”, in 41st Ann. IEEE Int. Carnahan
Conf. Secur. Technol., Ottawa, Canada, 2007, pp. 23–29.
[6] B. Fang, C. Leung, Y. Tang, K. Tseb, P. Kwokd, and Y. Wonge,
“Oﬀ-line signature verifcation by the tracking of feature and stroke
positions”, Pattern Recogn., vol. 36, pp. 91–101, 2003.
[7] A. Putz-Leszczyńska, J.and Pacut, “‘Hidden signature’ – a new so-
lution for on-line veriﬁcation ”, in 42nd Ann. IEEE Int. Carnahan
Conf. Secur. Technol., Prague, Czech Rebulic, pp. 68–73, 2008.
[8] J. Putz-Leszczyńska, “On-line signature veriﬁcation using dy-
namic time warping with positional coordinates”, in Proc. SPIE –
Vol. 6347, Photonics Applications in Astronomy, Communications,
Industry, and High-Energy Physics Experiments, R. S. Romaniuk,
Ed., 2006 (doi: 10.1117/12.714578).
[9] X.-L. X. M. R. L. Z.-H. Quan, D.-S. Huang and T.-M. Lok, “Spec-
trum analysis based on windows with variable widths for online sig-
nature veriﬁcation”, in Proc. 18th Int. Confe. Pattern Recogn. ICPR
2006), Hong Kong, China, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 1122–1125.
[10] B. L. Van, S. Garcia-Salicetti, and B. Dorizzi, “On using the viterbi
path along with hmm likelihood information for online signature ver-
iﬁcation”, IEEE Trans. Sys. Man. Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics,
vol. 37, no. 5, 2007.
[11] D. Guru and H. Prakash, “Symbolic representation of on-line signa-
tures”, in Proc. Int. Conf. Comput. Intellig. Multimedia Appl. 2007,
Sivakasi, India, 2007, pp. 313–317.
[12] J. Galbally, J. Fierrez, M. Freire, and J. Ortega-Garcia, “Feature
Selection Based on Genetic Algorithms for On-Line Signature Veri-
ﬁcation”, in Proc. IEEE Worksh. Autom. Identif. Adv. Technol. 2007,
Alghero, Italy, 2007, pp. 198–203.
[13] M. Faundez-Zanuy, “On-line signature recognition based on VQ-
DTW”, Pattern Recogn., vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 981–992, 2007.
[14] L. Nanni and A. Lumini, “A novel local on-line signature veriﬁcation
system,”, Pattern Recogn. Lett., vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 559–568, 2008.
[15] B. Yanikoglu and A. Kholmatov, “Online signature veriﬁcation using
fourier descriptors”, EURASIP J. Adv. Sig. Proces., 2009.
[16] J. Ortega-Garcia, J. Fierrez-Aguilar, D. Simon, J. Gonzalez,
M. Faundez-Zanuy, V. Espinosa, A. Satue, I. Hernaez, J.-J. Igarza,
C. Vivaracho, D. Escudero, and Q.-I. Moro, “MCYT baseline cor-
pus: a bimodal biometric database”, IEE Proc.-Vis. Image Sig. Pro-
cess., vol. 150, no. 6, pp. 3412–3426, 2003.
[17] H. Sakoe and S. Chiba, “Dynamic programming algorithm optimiza-
tion for spoken word recognition”, IEEE Trans. Acoust., Speech Sig.
Proces., vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 43–49, 1978.
Joanna Putz-Leszczyńska re-
ceived her M.Sc. in 2004 from
the Faculty of Electronics and
Information Technology of the
Warsaw University of Technol-
ogy, Poland. She is presently
a Ph.D. student at the Insti-
tute of Control and Computa-
tion Engineering at the Faculty
of Electronics and Information
Technology of the Warsaw Uni-
versity of Technology. Since 2003 she works as a Research
Assistant at Biometric Laboratory of Research and Aca-
demic Computer Network NASK. She is interested in bio-
metrics, identiﬁcation, security systems and global opti-
mization heuristics.
e-mail: J.Putz@elka.pw.edu.pl
Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK)
Wąwozowa st 18
02-796 Warsaw, Poland
Institute of Control and Computation Engineering
Warsaw University of Technology
Nowowiejska st 15/19
00-665 Warsaw, Poland
66
Hidden Signature for DTW Signature Veriﬁcation in Authorizing Payment Transactions
Michał Kudelski received his
M.Sc. in 2005 from the Faculty
of Electronics and Information
Technology of the Warsaw Uni-
versity of Technology, Poland.
He is presently a Ph.D. student
at the Institute of Control and
Computation Engineering at
the Faculty of Electronics and
Information Technology of the
Warsaw University of Technol-
ogy. Since 2008, he is also
a Research Assistant at the Biometric Laboratory of Re-
search and Academic Computer Network NASK. He is in-
terested in artiﬁcial intelligence, adaptive systems, biomet-
rics and related areas.
e-mail: M.Kudelski@elka.pw.edu.pl
Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK)
Wąwozowa st 18
02-796 Warsaw, Poland
Institute of Control and Computation Engineering
Warsaw University of Technology
Nowowiejska st 15/19
00-665 Warsaw, Poland
67
